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ABSTRACT
We present VoltKey, a method that transparently generates secret
keys for colocated devices, leveraging spatiotemporally unique
noise contexts observed in commercial power line infrastructure.
VoltKey extracts randomness from power line noise and securely
converts it into an authentication token. Nearby devices which
observe the same noise patterns on the powerline generate identical
keys. The unique noise pattern observed only by trusted devices
connected to a local power line prevents malicious devices without
physical access from obtaining unauthorized access to the network.
VoltKey is implemented inside of a standard USB power supply as
a platform-agnostic bolt-on addition to any IoT or mobile device or
any wireless access point that is connected to the power outlet.
KEYWORDS
Privacy; Mobile Systems; IoT; Hypervisors; Real-time
ACM Reference Format:
Jack West, Tien VoNguyen, Isaac Ahlgren, Iryna Motyashok, George K.
Thiruvathukal, Neil Klingensmith and Kyuin Lee, Dong He, Younghyun Kim,
Suman Banerjee. 2019. DemoAbstract:VoltKey: Using Power Line Noise for
Zero–Involvement Pairing and Authentication . In Proceedings of The 20th
International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (IPSN
’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.
nnnnnnn
1 INTRODUCTION
As breaches in apps, websites, and credit card processing networks
have become commonplace, it is increasingly clear that the best
kind of password is one that doesn’t exist. User-managed passwords
are perhaps the most important and widespread security weakness
of existing apps. Reliance on passwords is responsible for large-
scale identity theft, fraud, and even election manipulation. Usability
is an important consideration for personal IoT systems, mobile
apps, and web accounts that are deployed and maintained by non-
professional users. In particular, one of the paramount concerns
that have continued to vex researchers is the question of how to
quickly, securely, and effortlessly establish a common security key
between a newly introduced device and an existing network and to
subsequently manage the established connection securely.
Context-based pairing and authentication is a promising solu-
tion to this challenge. It exploits spatiotemporal randomness in
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Figure 1: System and threat models of VoltKey. A number
of IoT devices are installed in each home. As long as anyone
is in range of a router they can potentially access it.
the ambient environment often called contextual information [1].
The presence of common contextual information is evidence that
the devices are located in the same place at the same time, which
implies that they legitimately belong to the same user. The keys
generated from contextual information can, therefore, be used to
establish initial trust (as a pairing key) and to protect subsequent
communication (as a cryptographic key). This eliminates the need
for human involvement for making, entering, and managing a se-
cret key, which dramatically improves the overall usability of IoT
systems. In addition, the time-varying nature of contextual informa-
tion also allows devices to use a new key for each pairing attempt
or periodically update the cryptographic key, which significantly
reduces the attack window for adversarial agents.
In this work, we demonstrate a key generation method named
VoltKey [3], which harvests correlated random noise for wall
power outlets to generate authentication keys. More specifically,
VoltKey takes advantage of the fact that devices that are powered
by colocated electrical outlets, or those that are within the same
authenticated electrical domain, observe similar noise fingerprints
caused by the nearby electrical environment which is temporally
and spatially unique. VoltKey is embedded in standard USB power
supplies that are pervasively used in personal and domestic IoT and
mobile devices. For the reason that, it exploits standard power line
infrastructure that is ubiquitously available virtually everywhere,
VoltKey does not require additional supporting infrastructure for
installation. Using VoltKey, devices that wish to associate with
one another can simply be plugged into an existing power outlet
to automatically generate (and periodically regenerate) a unique
key and associate themselves with no involvement from the user.
In VoltKey-enabled networks, a device’s ability to authenticate
itself is dependent on its physical proximity to the host access
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Figure 2: (a)VoltKey’s analog front-end schematic. (b) Freq.
response of the twin-T notch filter used in our prototype.
point. The boundaries of an authenticated electrical domain are
determined by the electrical interconnect of the site.
2 VOLTKEY HARDWARE DESIGN
We design VoltKey as a modular addition to standard USB shipped
with IoT devices. In addition to supplying power, the module also
generates keys from superimposed noise on the power line and
transmits the keys to the device over a wired interface for pairing
and authentication purposes. VoltKey consists of two main com-
ponents: (1) the analog input circuitry for filtering and amplifying
power line noise and (2) a microcontroller unit (MCU) which in-
cludes an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) for noise measurement
and key extraction procedures.
Analog front-end. The analog front-end, illustrated in Fig. 2(a),
consists of an isolation transformer, a twin-T notch filter, and a
differential amplifier. The purpose of this circuit is to amplify high-
frequency noise from the power line and attenuate the 60 Hz funda-
mental. The transformer steps the 120 V AC power signal (between
hot and neutral) down to a lower voltage and isolates the VoltKey
circuitry from the power line. Our prototype uses a split-core trans-
former with two secondary coils: one to generate power for our
circuitry and the host and another to measure noise. We do not
want to measure noise on the same transformer tap that we use to
generate power because the noise from VoltKey ’s digital compo-
nents may corrupt the power line noise measurement. As illustrated
in Fig. 2(b), the twin-T notch filter attenuates the 60 Hz fundamental
frequency component from the voltage waveform. The 60 Hz com-
ponent is an unwanted signal in the context of VoltKey because
its harmonics carry a deterministic signal that repeats almost iden-
tically from period to period. Therefore, attenuating it improves
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). After the signal has been filtered, it
has an amplitude of 200–300 mV and an average value of 0 V. The
amplifier’s job is to shift and amplify the filtered signal so that its
range is within 0–3.3 V, the limits of the ADC. The diodes at the end
of the filter clip are filtered analog voltage waveforms between 0–
3.3 V to avoid damaging the op-amp and the ADC of the MCU. We
use an op-amp to generate a virtual ground of 0.7 V, and the output
of the twin-T notch filter is referenced to the virtual ground using
a voltage divider (immediately to the left of the diodes in Fig. 2(a)).
The amplitude of the noise varies considerably depending on active
electrical loads. When the signal amplitude is too small compared
to the ADC dynamic range, we may get a poor measurement due
to a large quantization error; if it is too big, the peaks of the noise
will be clipped by the diodes and lost. To deal with this issue, we
build a adjustable gain amplifier to allow software to dynamically
adapt to changing noise conditions, adjusting the gain accordingly.
The adjustable gain amplifier is built from a standard configuration
of a non-inverting op-amp circuit with bipolar junction transistors
in the feedback loop between the inverting input and VGND. The
GAINSELx signals are connected to the microcontroller’s GPIO lines
via bias resistors, allowing software to modify the amplifier’s gain.
MCU and ADC. VoltKey uses a low-cost MCU to measure and
process the voltage signal on the power outlet. Our hardware pro-
totype is equipped with the Microchip’s ATSAMD51, a 32-bit ARM-
Cortex M4 [2], running at 120 MHz with an on-chip ADC capable
of sampling rate of up to 1 MSPS at a 12-bit resolution. The MCU
also has a USB device functionality which can be used to transfer
the computed keys to the host over a virtual COM port (serial)
interface. The MCU we chose is considerably more powerful than
necessary—VoltKey’s application uses very little memory and can
run on a low-power processor.
Key Generation Protocol.
(1) Measurement: Device B (e.g., an IoT device) contacts Device A
(e.g., a WiFi access point) to initiate independent power line noise
measurement. Note that the sampling clock (time and rate) can
vary between A and B.
(2) Sampling rate estimation: Each device independently estimates
the sampling rate of its own ADC sample buffer.Let cA and cB be
the estimated sampling rate of A and B.
(3) Sampling ratematching: Both devices resample their ADC buffers
to make the sampling rates are identical.
(4) Time synchronization: Device B syncs its measurement time to
that of A using a short snippet of samples shared from Device A.
(5) Bit sequence extraction: Both devices independently extract bit
sequences from their sample buffers.
(6) Reconciliation: Differences in the extracted bit sequences are
corrected by B with publicly exchanged data through key reconcili-
ation stage.
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